Burkina Faso’s transitional government is trying to show that its governance agenda goes beyond the war on security. Between 2025 and early 2026, a series of highly publicized trials and regular administrative controls has sketched out a governance logic stretching from the “fight against impunity” to “internal disciplinary sanctions.” But the strength of that chain depends on its ability to withstand the double pressure of political reality and accumulated institutional failings.
On the anti-impunity front, official figures carry notable weight. According to the Prime Minister’s office’s assessment of the Justice Ministry’s 2025 performance contract, more than 394 cases linked to violent crimes, embezzlement of public funds and corruption were tried during the year, accompanied by seizures and confiscations estimated at between 10 billion and 15 billion CFA francs.
The National Agency for the Management of Seized Assets effectively returned about 5.3 billion CFA francs to the public treasury.
More symbolically, the government has also turned on “its own”: in February 2026, four high-ranking judges and three customs officers were sentenced to firm prison terms for corruption-related offenses, including Judge Urbain Méda, known for having handled the Thomas Sankara assassination case and for enjoying considerable standing in judicial circles.
The message is clear: sanctions are no longer aimed only at petty street offenders but are beginning to reach the nodes of power inside the system.
At the same time, internal sanctions are extending their reach into the heart of the administrative apparatus.
According to evaluation documents released by the International Monetary Fund, Burkina Faso has already handed prison sentences to several public agents from the Ministry of Humanitarian Action involved in embezzling public funds, and a nine-month investigation by the anti-corruption body KORAG into about 20 public agents has also entered its sanctions phase.
Operationally, the government is using technology to shrink spaces for rent-seeking at the local level, including by introducing direct electronic payment of fines to the Treasury during roadside checks, removing cash contact between police and citizens, and using hidden cameras to gather evidence going so far as to broadcast images of corrupt officials on national television.
These methods are strongly “exemplary” in character, with a deterrent intent far more marked than the patience required for institutional construction.
Yet the real test of good governance lies not in the number of people sanctioned but in the predictability and consistency of sanctions.
When the judicial system can try a few judges but struggles to answer the question “why were these failings not addressed for so many years?”, internal sanctions risk sliding toward a perception of selective justice.
From the fight against impunity to internal sanctions, Burkina Faso has taken a necessary step.
But for that step to be solid, it does not need more individual cases publicly exposed; it needs a set of rules whose standard does not vary according to the identity of the people concerned.
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